Rice Culure of Divine Right in Celestially Ordered Zone by Mukherjee, Rila
Rila Mukherjee*
Rice Culture of Divine Right
in a Celestially Ordered Zone:
A Case Study of South Asian and South-East
Asian Ideologies and Hegemonies from c.2000 B.C.
to c. 1800 A.D. with Specific Reference to Bengal
Revista Lusófona de Ciências Sociais
2004, 1, 49-72
campus
social
I
Gunder Frank pointed out in ReOrient that a narrative of  the pre-colonial south Asian
economy is incomplete without referring to contacts between  the four empires of  the
Ottomans, the Safavids, the Mughals and the Chinese (with various points in between such
as the northern Mediterranean, northern and eastern Africa and the Indonesian archipelago).
He also said in ReOrient that a history of trade, finance and price movements, as well as
population, money and commodity flows, necessitates a new world history from a
‘globological’ perspective. Eurocentric history and social theory are inadequate to explain
the ‘rise of the west’ between 1400-1800. 1
Unfortunately this is not how pre-modern South Asian maritime trade is constructed by
economic and maritime historians. This article seeks to place Bengal-traditionally regarded
as a zone of rice-culture of ‘divine right’ by virtue of Brahmanical settlement in a commercial
zone that was also determined by Bengal’s place in successive religious-cultural networks
stretching from Central Asia to China. Conventional studies of the Bay of Bengal economies
have tended to focus on the Coromandel area; nonetheless Bengal occupied a vital position
in the religious life of Buddhism — and then Islam — in the northern part of the Bay of
Bengal. This article will therefore attempt to define Bengal’s role vis-à-vis ‘ideologies’ and
‘hegemonies’ radiating across both the cultural worlds of the middle Gangetic plain and the
Bay of Bengal.
A reconstruction of South Asian (and Bengal’s) maritime history has to take in long-
term cycles of expansion and decline in world economies in the period 1200 to 1800. While
these expansions and contractions impacted on the Indian ocean at large; in Bengal’s case
the specific cycles of hegemony are: 1) the Buddhist network in the Bay of Bengal that
continued until at least the 12th century, 2) the economy of the first Islamic world —
mediated by the Mongol political system — that stretched from Africa to China. This lasted
from the 13th to the 16th centuries, 3) the Chinese dominance in the Bay of Bengal, 4) a sub-
economy in northern Bay of Bengal dominated by eastern Bengal, Arakan and Pegu, 5) the
Mughal economy that lasted from the 16th to the 18th centuries. This changed the course of
the commercial history of Bengal, and 6) the European economy that impacted into the
Indian Ocean with the coming of the Portuguese. Such a reading will show that regional
‘hegemons’ such as the Iberian-North African, Ottoman, Persian, Central Asian, South
________
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Asian, the Javan-Sumatran and the Chinese were far more influential in determining trends
in South Asian commerce than a relatively insignificant region such as the European2.
When I first decided to focus on pre-Plassey Bengal for my PhD thesis3 I was faced with
a formidable dilemma. How was I to reconcile my findings on the silk trade at Kasimbazar
with the idea of ‘Asian Trade’ that focussed on Indian Ocean ports? Kasimbazar was a
singular riverine port in 18th century Bengal in that it experienced a truly amazing volume of
traffic. But it was neither ‘coastal’ nor ‘oceanic’. I faced difficulties in dealing with this
ubiquitous topic called Asian Trade and this quandary was  already reflected in scholarly
works. Asian Trade (why not ‘European’ or ‘Islamic’ trade for that matter? Was there
something specific about the trade of the Indian Ocean that singled it out as being Asian
and therefore different? Could riverine/coastal trade be an offshoot of ‘Asian Trade’? I still
think so, but how do we situate Bengal in this schema?) is deemed today an a-historical
concept, a concept that denies momentum to non-European societies; moreover it is
singularly atemporal in nature. Asian Trade signifies, by its very nomenclature, a pre-
capitalist and a ‘pre-modern’ preoccupation. After all, all of Bengal’s ports are riverine
ports; does this then mean that Bengal conducted no long-distance (‘Asian’) trade in
history? For those beset by these dilemmas studies of coastal and long distance trade
remained uni-dimensional as long as developments — comprising linkages, growth, ruptures,
transitions and transformations — on both land and sea (including rivers) were not taken
into account. It was felt necessary to integrate studies of the trading society under enquiry
into the trading rhythms of larger regions of which it is a part. This essay hopes to accomplish
this, even if somewhat partially, for Bengal.
II
In traditional literature Bengal is portrayed as a frontier country, a place unknown, but
one where fortunes were made and unmade. At the same time, the idea that rivers made and
unmade Bengal, took shape. The idea of Bengal, as a hell full of good things, took root from
the 14th century and is attributed to Ibn Batuta the famous Maghrebian traveller who visited
Bengal in the first half of the 14th century; this  was subsequently attributed to other
travellers who left behind accounts of Bengal; most notably François Bernier and Robert
Challes (both of whom visited Bengal in the 17th century). The notion of Bengal as a hell
with abundance was echoed as late as in the 18th century when the Riyas-us-Salatin stated
this same sentiment unambiguously.
The flag of dissidence was frequently raised from Bengal. In 1579 Abu’l-Fazl called
Bengal bulghak-khana or a ‘house of turbulence’4.In Mughal times a posting to Bengal
was deemed a demotion away from the corridors of power at Delhi, Agra or Lahore; yet it
was emphasised that fortunes awaited those subahdars who braved this unsavoury posting.
This diffidence, these reservations persisted because Bengal’s frontier culture was
unfamiliar to north India. A fish-eating land, its culture was perceived as alien by the Mughal
ashrafi culture of the north. Bengalis were dismissed as ‘bands of fishermen’—a livelihood
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and culture that the Mughals despised5. Given this unsavoury reputation of Bengal what
could be called the distinguishing feature of Bengal that set it apart from the rest of the
South Asian sub-continent? Was it its distant location, its specific agrarian-commercial
economy (a mix of paddy cultivation and coastal navigation) or its distinct religious culture?
What were its chief characteristics? Its trans-border affiliations, its riverine topography, or
its distinct material culture? In other words what forms the identity of Bengal? Is there one
Bengal, or have there been many Bengals in its turbulent history?
In earlier times Bengal was an amorphous zone which contained within it various Bengals.
In time the various Bengal coalesced into two Bengals: the one centreing around Lakhnawati
–Gaur (west) and the other around Dhaka-Vikrampur (east). These divisions continued into
the 18th century and their different politics and economic policies—ruled by external agencies
such as frontier affiliations and internal factors such as the massive riverine changes from
west to east from the 16th to the 18th centuries—determined life to a great extent.
If we look back in time we see that of the many Bengals in history  there was colonial
Bengal in the recent past,  there was Islamic (Nawabi, Afghan, Mughal and Sultani) Bengal
in the  more remote past, a Puranic Bengal further back, a Buddhist-Tantric Bengal yet
further back and there was finally the multi-faceted Vanga or non — aryanised Bengal in the
very distant past. In its most recent avatar Bengal was the arena of British imperialism;
further back Bengal was in the vortex of Muslim expansion and European settlement; and
yet further back Bengal—the eastern heartland of the Gangetic plain—was part of the
Hindu and Buddhist kingdoms of Sasanka, the Palas , the Varmans, the Chandras and the
Senas. Bengal therefore has made the journey from ancient Vanga, via medieval Bangalah
and  subah Bangla, to modern Bengal in history.
Bengal’s geographical boundaries have fluctuated over time; the large subah Bangla
incorporating Bihar and a part of Orissa of the 18th century is not the Bengal we know today.
Its eastern frontier was substantially reduced after 1947 when eastern Bengal became East
Pakistan (and then Bangladesh in 1971).
III
Bengal is a frontier zone of India even today: both locationally and culturally. Historically
Bengal formed a zone with fluid boundaries to the north, east and south. Its northern
frontier was dictated by its relationship with Tirhut (Mithila), and beyond; its eastern
frontier depended on interactions with the Tripura, Koch, Kamta, Kamrup and Arakan
kingdoms; its southern frontier at Jajnagar demarcated Bengal from the mainly  southernised
Orissa. The incorporation of Bengal into mainstream middle Gangetic culture was achieved
by constantly pushing forward the various frontiers within a given period—the agrarian
frontier, the political frontier, the cultural frontier, the religious frontier and the demographic
frontier.  In the process Bengal’s story has not been simply one of integration (or
incorporation) with dominant political powers emanating from the gangetic heartland but
also one whereby the ascendant state power and political ideologies of any given moment
have been, time and again, forced to come to terms with Bengal’s unique frontier culture .
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The earliest annals do not refer directly to Bengal—it was only when the frontiers of
aryabharta were consistently pushed outwards in the aftermath of the Gupta epoch that
Bengal assummed its own identity. Kulke remarks6:
After the decline of the Gupta Empire and of the ‘transient’ successor state under
King Harsa in the early seventh century, the overwhelming majority of the early
medieval states of India emerged from a process of continuous agrarian expansion
and political integration…this development took place mainly in those areas of
the South Asian subcontinent which had lain at the periphery or even outside the
core areas of ancient state formations. This process started from local nuclei of
early socio-economic and political development and increasingly came to include
their hinterlands. (My emphasis).
This passage implies the following schema for Bengal: 1) that although both the earliest
centralised states in India were located in the east (viz. the Mauryas and the Guptas),
Bengal lay outside their core areas, 2) the expansion of these two early centralised states
was directed towards the west and not east and therefore Bengal did not form even the
periphery of these states, 3) it was between the 5th and the 7th centuries that the first states
appeared in Bengal 7, 4) the dynamic of state formation started from numerous ‘local nuclei’
of growth, 5) these local nuclei in their turn evolved into states by incorporating their
hinterlands. It is therefore clear that not one, but various states emerged from the post-
Gupta phase in Bengal.
Therefore there was never one Bengal even in the ancient period. Just as there have
been many ‘Bengals’ in recorded history  there have been, within each of them, ‘diverse’
Bengals . The area we refer to as Bengal today comprised various small states (in the order
north to south) in ancient times known as Pundra, Varendra, Rarh and Vardhamana in the
west and Harikela and Samatata in the east. The dividing line between the two regions was
Pundravardhana which comprised within it the area called Vanga (Banga). With time the
different political and ethnic nomenclatures of Bengal 8finally coalesced into three Bengals—
Varendra or the political heartland, Vanga, its economic and cultural unit which became
synonymous with the province and the often neglected Samatata (or the political ‘other’ of
Varendra) with its autonomous economic heartland in Harikela.9 These divisions were clear
to the observer by the 7th century.
In very early times Vanga was the political and social frontier of Bengal and beyond it
lay unknown lands peopled by strange peoples with fanciful names. These distinct
geographical and political units, inhabited by particular peoples with specific tribal attributes
and social attitudes, were therefore designated within a particular place/time context that
varied over time10.
The peoples of Bengal—the Pundras, the Radhs, the Suhmas, the Vangas and the
Gaudiyas along with the cities and ports of Kotivarsam, Tamralipta and Ganga—are first
attested to variously in the Aitareya Brahman, the Aitareya Aranyaka ; later in the
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Arthasastra and in the texts of Strabo, Diodorus,Plutarch and Pliny ; they are also referred
to in contemporary Jain and Buddhist texts.
States within Bengal were equally diverse. That the entire area was undergoing an
almost continuous process of state formation(s)—was evidenced in ever new names for
kingdoms, cities and peoples—from  later Vedic literature which mention the peoples of
Anga, Vanga Pundra,Tamraliptaka, Suhma and Radh ; from the writings of  Diodorus, Curtius,
Pliny and Plutarch who mention the mighty kingdoms of the Gangarides and the Prasoi,
their military might  and the splendid emporia of  Ganga in the Gangarides kingdom (both
Plutarch and the anonymous The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea mention this) we glean an
idea of the wealth of this frontier land; and from the Sabhaparvan of the Mahabharata and
the Ayodhya Kanda of the Ramayana which mention the Suhma, Prasuhma, Vanga,
Tamralipta, and Pracya as independent kingdoms we get an idea of the diverse peoples in
the region. The Jain and Buddhist inscriptions similarly attest to the existence of numerous
states in ancient Bengal.
Bengal has been, through history, a cosmopolitan melting-pot. It is possible, by going
through a detailed chronological study of the inscriptions and manuscripts, to discern the
main lines of Bengal’s early civilization from circa 2000 B.C. to the 4th century A.D.11 The
excavations of Pandu Rajar Dhibi prove that at least 2000 years before the beginning of the
Gregorian calendar Bengal possessed a definite non-Aryan culture, based on the use of
iron implements, specific black and red ware and some wet rice cultivation along with
contact with overseas cultures. The find of a seal at Pandu Rajar Dhibi similar to the Minoan
seals of Knossos has led  many  to speculate that the coastal regions of eastern India may
have established contact with the Minoan civilization of Crete.
Reading between the lines from the sources we have mentioned it seems likely that the
tribal peoples of the various parts of eastern India were slowly coming into contact with the
Vedic civilization emanating from the upper Gangetic plain. The eastern limits of madhyadesa
were constantly pushed outwards as Vedic culture changed its perception of the tribals
from rakshasas to mlechhas, that is from monsters to unclean peoples, who might , at a later
stage, be co-opted into the Vedic hierarchy. Reading from left to right madhyadesha’s
frontiers shifted from Uttar Pradesh to Bihar and then to Bengal. By the time of the writing
of the Manava Dharmasastra (2nd B.C.?) the eastern limit of madhyadesa had moved to
Prayag in present day Uttar Pradesh. It was now only a matter of time before Magadh (in
present day Bihar state) too became a part of aryabharta or madhyadesa.
The early Jain and Buddhist texts and inscriptions offer us a glimpse of the expanding
frontiers of a hegemonic culture. Early Buddhist texts such as Anguttara, Mahavastu,
Vinaya and Niddesa do not include any of the Bengal kingdoms mentioned among the
sixteen great republics but the Jain Bhagavati-Sutra includes Anga, Vanga and Magadha in
its list of the sixteen great countries of India. Bengal was now therefore only a step away
from this radical ‘colonization’; this happened under Gupta aegis around 4th century A.D. in
Vanga but this colonization was achieved only partially . The eastern section of the gangetic
delta remained outside the orbit of direct Gupta control. Harikela or the easternmost area
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became an addendum to Samatata and its history is obscure to this day  for the most part.
Even today , this area’s turbulent history remains outside the ambit of historical research.
With time Vanga assumed dominant status—at least iconographically—over other states
in Bengal. We do not know the reasons for the hegemony of Vanga but it seems likely that
its fame as the most productive region within Bengal as well as its proximity to Varendra
(Gaur) or the political nerve centre was responsible for its new status. From Maurya times
the region of Vanga or the western part of the lower gangetic delta , co-terminous with the
ancient kingdom of Gangarides and wealthy in terms of natural and material resources,
claimed dominance over the regions of Pundra, Radh and Varendra in the western half. By
the time of Samudragupta the entire area was conquered and reunified as Vanga.
We can say that by the time the Guptas consolidated their empire in eastern India the
great ‘eastward migration’ of the aryas had reached the last frontier. Rabid brahmanism
under Gupta aegis combined with existing social and cultural norms to produce an unique
form of aryanisation in Bengal. Aryan ideals slowly permeated political and military norms.
As ‘aryanisation’ proceeded hand in hand with expanding wet rice cultivation it became
ever more imperative to find rulers of either lowly origin, or outside the aryan fold a place
within the new social pyramid that was becoming generic throughout the upper and middle
gangetic plain. Those who declined, or were considered unfit of being co-opted into the
new order, were banished to forests and mountains as waves of ‘civilization’ swelled in
magnitude. Where such rulers continued in power in defiance of aryan norms they were
marginalised and referred to either as ‘kings of the mountains’ or ‘of the forests’. The term
‘Vanga’ now became a general noun describing the entire state of Bengal except its eastern
parts—Samatata and Harikela. Now only parts of Harikela (north of Samatata and contiguous
with Cooch Bihar and Tripura), Samatata and Kamrup remained to be aryanised. This was
achieved only partially due to Buddhist-Tantric influences and the Muslim presence there.
This civilizing wave gained momentum when, around the 5th century A.D., new
administrative and agrarian patterns came into being. These necessitated a new social
framework. More jatis were born. In other parts of South Asia it was from this time that the
temple and the ideological position of the Brahman became the loci from which hegemony
was articulated. It was also from this time that obscure rulers came to the  political forefront
and  turned to Brahmans to legitimise their lineages. Many claimed kshatriya status and
sought fictitious genealogies linking them to the cardinal suryavamsi and candravamsi
lineages of the Puranas. In some cases dynasties traced their descent from powerful
Brahmans. In either case these were tools exercised for assimilating non aryas within the
dominant ideological fold. Hinduism, as Kulke points out 12, was the most adaptive religious
and social system that was open to aspects of ‘localisation’ or ‘indigenisation’. The new
model of varna-jati whose two criteria of difference were language and the observance of
codes regarding the organisation of society (varnasramadharma ) and not either race or
economic superiority, thus offered a superb exemplar of social advancement and political
authority not just within India but in neighbouring regions as well.
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IV
But Brahmanism’s progress in Bengal was impeded because of an unique geographical
factor. Bengal lay at the southern tip of an arc that extended from the Eastern Himalayas to
Tibet. Events here took a different course. After the Guptas’ promotion of Brahmanism
Buddhism was the dominant vehicle through which kingship and state formation was
articulated in Bengal, except in the case of the somewhat enigmatic Sasanka who was
terribly anti-Buddhist. The early ‘aryanised’ states in Bengal —  which were also Buddhist
—  offered its neighbours a novel and flexible model of political rule based on social division,
equilibrium and an amalgam of Hindu practices and Buddhist ideals.
Legitimation was not the only attraction for tribal leaders here. It has been pointed out
by Wolters that the magico-religious component of tapasya inherent in Hinduism was
particularly attractive for tribal leaders who sought to move from a pre state to a ‘state
stage’.13 Soon this model sought to replicate itself across its natural frontiers—in the case
of Bengal this was naturally in the countries of northern-South East Asia. The small, scattered
‘countries’ and empires of south east Asia—tribal in polity and social organisation—offered
an ideal terrain for this penultimate wave of ‘aryanisation’. This was particularly visible in
the case of the early Pyu states (Burma/Myanmar) and especially Arakan with whom Bengal
shared a common cultural and economic zone14.
There was a substantial Buddhist network that already passed overland through North
India. Maurice Lombard tells us of the Buddhist network of trade through Turkestan which
joined India and China through mountain passes of the Hindu Kush and Central Asia. This
was also a massive conduit for trade. It is not clear to what extent Bengal participated in this
network but we know that cotton went from India to China in the 6th  century through this
route15; Chaudhuri opines however that cotton cultivation really expanded in China in the
post Sung period in the 11th century16.
The Buddhist network was a bond that greatly expanded maritime trade from Bengal.
The bond emanating from Bengal dominated the northern Bay of Bengal while the Coromandel
ports concentrated on the southern Bay of Bengal world. Leaving aside the issues of
‘colonisation’, ‘brahmanisation’, ‘indigenisation’ or ‘accultration’ that have been raised by
R.C.Majumdar, Nilkantha Sastri, George Coedes, Kulke and Quatrich-Wales17, it was clear
that a new maritime space had come into being in the Bay of Bengal.
The Buddhist network seems to have survived the growing Islamic presence in the Bay
(in the shape of Arab traders) that exploded into the Bay of Bengal from the 7th century. From
the 7th century onwards the decline in Roman trade had been apparent. Arab trade now
provided the impetus behind external trade to link East Asia with the west. Unlike the case
with Roman trade, Bengal played an increasingly important role in both the Buddhist18 and
Arab networks. Mohar Ali points to three Abbasid coins that were found at the Buddhist
settlements of Paharpur and Mainamati as indicative of growing Islamic trade in eastern
Samatata in the 8th /9th centuries19. Growing Islamic presence in the Chattagram(Chittagong/
Xatigam/Chatighan)-Arakan area  during this time indicates that this part of Bengal,
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predominantly Buddhist in inclination, was becoming integrated into a growing Islamic
trading network in the Bay 20. We have seen that the culture of cotton cultivation spread
from India to Mesopotamia and the Mediterannean world (Syria, Aleppo, the shores of the
Dead Sea, Damascus and Cilisia) by the 7th century21. It is likely that some of the cotton that
found its way both east (China) and west (Mesopotamia/Mediterranean) originated from
the Bengal trade. Some cotton went to South East Asia from Bengal by way of the Bay.
Therefore from the 7th century Bengal participated actively in the northern Bay of Bengal
commerce. Of necessity this was a coastal commerce because of the fierce cyclones that
could suddenly hit this part of the Bay.
Studies in early coastal archaeology tell us that the Bengal-Orissa coast (Sisupalgarh/
Tamralipta) traded with Burma, Thailand and Malaysia; what is pertinent to Bengal’s maritime
links with the world of the northern Bay is that of these the site of Beikthano on the
Irrawady in Central Burma, which experienced considerable trade with Bengal (on the basis
of Rouletted Ware findings), was occupied until the 8th century AD22. The evidence from
Beikthano is particularly important in light of the thesis we are developing about Bengal’s
commercial contacts with Arakan. Beikthano was populated by the Pyus. The state of
Arakan that rose in the eleventh century was Pyu in origin. While it now seems evident that
the growing Arab presence in the Bay was  responsible for the decay of the ancient maritime
sites in the Bay of Bengal a Buddhist network continued to exist in the northern Bay until at
least the 12th century. This linkage between the Bengal and Burma coasts continued beyond
the 11th century when the greater Buddhist network collapsed in the Bay. Interaction was
facilitated with the emergence of the state of Arakan in the 11th century. Bengal and Burma,
with their fluid borders, extensive riverine and coastal networks and a shared material
culture of supplementing agriculture with fishing and coastal trade continued to experience
commercial ties until the conclusive Mughal orientation of Bengal’s trade westward broke
up this ‘little’ trade that encompassed the Padma, Meghna, Brahmaputra and Irrawady
valleys and the numerous creeks that acted as outlets to the Bay.
Conventional wisdom has it that Hinduism and Buddhism co-existed peacefully in Bengal
but history tells us otherwise. It seems that Brahmanical and Buddhist ‘colonisation’ in
Bengal, far from unifying the region, had actually sculpted it into two distinct political
entities, especially after the rule of Sasanka. By the 9th century one was Gaur from where the
dominant political discourse was articulated. The other was the Dacca-Vikrampur region
which enunciated a different rhetoric that frequently challenged the hegemonic pretensions
of Gaur.
The post-Sasanka  pre-Pala period in Bengal (8th-9th centuries) is traditionally described
as the period of matsya-nyaya or interregnum. But a closer investigation of the period under
review shows that this was essentially a Gaur (or west) centred view of politics in Bengal.
While political authority may have declined from Gaur in the post-Sasanka period the region
of samatata or the south eastern portion of the delta, which we call the Dacca-Vikrampur
region, seems to have emerged as a distinct economic region with mainly Buddhist
affiliations. This region manifested considerable political and economic vigour as evinced
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from the verve of so called ‘minor’ dynasties there: the Bhadras, the Khadgas, the Chandras,
the Varmans and the Devas who continued to rule as independent kings up until the time of
the Sena conquest of Bengal in the 12th century.
Sasanka’s legacy therefore lay in the creation of two centers of poltical authority in
Bengal: Gaur under the Palas and Vikrampur under the Chandras. The Vikrampur state
continued to promote commercial activity. The Chandras coined silver currency at a time
when trade under Pala leadership from Gaur was in decline; moreover the Chandras claimed
lineage from the 7th century Chandras of Arakan, meddled frequently in the politics of
Arakan, carried on a brisk commerce with that kingdom and also conducted a profitable
coastal trade among the countries across the northern Bay.
Therefore it seems certain that Brahmanical (Puranic) expansion and Buddhist hegemony
had clashed in Bengal, and far from unifying the region, had actually sculpted it into two
distinct political entities with different cultural and economic affiliations. Morrison’s analysis
of inscriptions from land grants suggests that far from being an alternative capital Vikrampur
may have been the only capital in the delta that was the administrative centre for the whole
of Bengal.
Note that Vikrampur lay in a strategic position at the joining of the Meghna and the
Padma. It was placed in a supreme position for putting the  goods of the north-east coming
through the Brahmaputra in touch with the goods of the west through the Ganga-Padma.
Plates of property transfers from Vikrampur from  the tenth to the thirteenth centuries
suggest that it was the only capital that had the power to issue  proclamations for the whole
of Bengal 23. Moreover land grants from Samatata exhibit a different character from those
elsewhere in the delta. This area recorded the highest number of land grants and property
transfers to collectives rather than individuals such as monasteries and shrines. The plates
from Samatata are markedly pro-Buddhist (six out of seventeen inscriptions) unlike those of
Varendra which are pro-brahman in character. It is clear that Samatata, bound by the three
large river systems of the Ganga/Padma, the Meghna and the Brahmaputra, was the political
and economic nerve centre of the region from where the Chandras, the Varmans and, later
the Senas, ruled Bengal. The large grants to institutions, the concentration of major building
sites (Lalmai/Paharpur) and the existence of a silver currency in Samatata suggest its rulers
were wealthier and more able to offer a stable administrative system than their contemporaries
in the west 24. Inscriptional evidence from Samatata therefore modifies considerably the
received history about Gaur as the only durable capital of an unified Bengal.
We noted that Vikrampur manifested considerable economic vitality. At a time when the
Palas used cowrie shells as currency in Gaur their rivals, the Chandras, used a silver currency
in the east. The Chandras were Buddhists from Rohtasgarh in Bihar. More significant, they
were an offshoot of the royal house of Arakan which is further proof of the very fluid
borders that existed between Bengal and upper south east Asia. After the Palas reconverted
back to Hinduism Buddhists from Bengal went north and east; and some went to Arakan.
Arakan became an important Buddhist state in the 11th century and its revived trade with
Bengal may be seen as an offshoot of the 11th century trade revolution in the Indian Ocean25.
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Moreover since the Chandras were supposed to be of Arakanese lineage this helped cement
Bengal’s traditional commercial links further with Arakan from the 11th century26. The usage
of a medium of international trade points to the area’s enduring ties with northern south
east Asia at a time when trade possibilities radiating from Gaur towards the middle gangetic
plain were shrinking. The rise of Chattagram as the premier port of the region dates from this
period.
The Pagan kings of Burma maintained considerable contact with the Mainamati Buddhist
area in Bengal and both Pagan and Bengal interfered in Arakanese politics. The King of
Pattikera gave his daughter to King Alaungsithu of Pagan in marriage. The most important
and longest- lived centres in Bengal (in proximity to Arakan) were the towns of  Comilla and
Mainamati, both in the vicinity of the Lalmai range. Mainamati was very likely Patikkera, the
neighbouring state to which Burmese chronicles attributed so much significance. It was at
that place where as late as in AD1219-20 one of the rulers (named Ranavankamalla
Harikelade-va) made a donation to the monastery of the Buddhist goddess Durgottara27.
The Chandras were the overlords of these lesser kings. The dynasty, by reason of its
proximity to the sea and by virtue of its considerable international trade, maintained a large
fleet. It is said that the Varmans defeated the Chandras in a sea battle where the last Chandra
king went down in his ship. This ended Buddhist rule in the east. Similarly the Palas of Gaur
were defeated by another band of military adventurers from outside (Senas) which professed
srtong Brahmanical loyalties.
Until the Islamic conquest Bengal possessed two distinct centres of political authority:
one drawing upon the resources of the Bhagirathi-Hugli basin and sustaining itself on
paddy cultivation, the other relying upon the Padma-Meghna delta and participating in
international trade. Inscriptions of the Chandras and the Varmans from their capital at
Vikrampur illustrate the measures that these dynasties were taking to strengthen their empire
in the Harikela-Samatata region. The Rampal and Kedarpur copper plates of Srichandra and
the Belava copper plate of Bhojavarman clearly articulate an alternate discourse of kingship
from Pala to Sena times in eastern Bengal.28
V
However, from the 10th and 11th centuries, Hinduism was outpacing Buddhism in Bengal.
The expanding nature of the society and economy of Vanga is evident from the names of
offices and functionaries that are mentioned in inscriptions29. They indicate a highly complex
and sophisticated culture based on the effective appropriation of natural wealth through
agriculture and regulated by a strong ideological/religious system. There are separate terms
for centre and district (Adhikarana and Adhisthana), mention of various taxes, names of
functionaries in charge of specific manufactures, designations of supervisors of public and
religious edifices (Avasathika) and special officers (Devadroni-Sambaddha) charged with
the maintenance of temples and sacred water tanks. The inscriptions also mention  various
categories of administrative officials, numerous classes of citizens and their ocupations.30
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The variegated functions quoted above may be taken as being indicative of segregated
tribal kingdoms coming under an unified political umbrella in the final transition from
isolationism to actual ‘empire building’ in ancient Bengal. The designations and offices
prove that western Bengal, then, primarily an agricultural economy. Agrarian surplus, and
not profits from trade, supported the emergent states in the west. A conservative Hinduism
promoted agricultural matters, to the possible detriment of trade.
It was first George Coedes, and subsequently Quatrich-Wales, Denys Lombard and
K.N.Chaudhuri (among others) who pointed out the topographical similarities between
Bengal and South East Asia31. Such similarities contributed to the distinctive material culture
of this predominantly riverine, rice-culture dominated zone and led to the formation of
agrarian, rice based, empires and states in the littoral region surrounding the Bay of Bengal
and the Java Sea.
Historically speaking the successful articulation of political power in this region has
always based itself on two stark realities — control over surplus grain and control over the
waterways32. This articulation of political power was effected through specific ideological
structures peculiar to the eastern coast of India and south east Asia. However such a
sophisticated articulation of power and its concommitant ideology was beyond the scope
of warring tribes and could only come about when one tribe imposed its power over all
others in the region. A degree of centralised rule, along with appropriate religio-political
ideology, was therefore essential in the transformation of tribal zones into states capable of
tapping the vast agrarian and natural resources at their command. With time therefore the
flat riverine plains of Bengal (and South East Asia subsequently) saw the rise of a divine
political economy and validating philosophy in this distinct topographic zone — what
Denys Lombard calls a ‘rice culture of divine right’33 based on the successful appropriation
of legitimising models for lineage construction and the economic control of the area. Such
a model had to operate within societies that were organised hierarchically (and not spatially
as had been tribal societies) on the basis of varna, with jati being used as a mechanism of
incorporating newly conquered peoples 34.
From the time of the Guptas until the time of the Senas, that is between the 5th to the 13th
centuries—a period for which we have somewhat comprehensive records—we have seen
that major activities consisted of continually expanding the political and cultural frontiers
of civilization, instituting rice culture as the dominant economy of the region and settling
Brahmans in the forested lands of the eastern margin  (Samatata) to popularise wet rice
cultivation in the east. In the process the tribal culture of Bengal with its jhum cultivation
was overshadowed by emerging Brahmanical expertise based on superior agricultural skills.
Along with  subordination to a vastly superior technique for expanding cultivation the
tribal peoples of Bengal were subject to the hegemony of Vedic civilization as embodied in
the four fold varna scheme. Within this vast span of time there were two distinct phases.
Between the 5th and 10th centuries this process continued inexorably. More and more of
the eastern part was brought under cultivation. The frontier now extended beyond Samatata
to Kamrup and the hostile territory outside it. After the 10th century there was a hiatus in the
60
Rila Mukherjee
agrarian expansion; the eastern delta (Samatata) engaged more in trade and less in
agriculture35. This development was dictated by events between the 7th to the 9th centuries
( that is the period between Sasanka’s rule and the advent of the Palas). During this time
western Bengal or Vanga became synonymous with Gaur as the seat of the mighty non-
Buddhist empire of Sasanka. Agricultural activities became more important; trade declined
because of Sanka’s hostility to Buddhism. The eastern deltaic region or Samatata remained
geographically and culturally a distinct zone and often challenged Gaur’s political hegemony.
Moreover this area was staunchly Buddhist — vwitness the large Buddhist settlements of
Mainamati-Lalmai, Paharpur and Mahastan. The questionable political allegiances of the
eastern parts became evident after the downfall of Sasanka’s state. Successive rulers of
Bengal from the time of Sasanka tried to subdue Samatata and Kamrup and enrol them as
feudatories but were  not successful. In spite of hosting the dynamic Bhadra, Khadga and
Chandra dynasties Samatata/Harikela remained a frontier region with politically suspect
affiliations.
This area was finally brought into the folds of Brahmanism by the Varmans who succeeded
the Chandras but they too, it seems from extant inscriptions, reigned as political rivals of the
Senas who succeeded the Palas in the western delta. Samatata continued to be, until the
nineteenth century, outside the pale of Vanga’s dominion. By then of course Vanga had
metamorphosed into colonial Bengal.
VI
From the 13th to the 16th centuries Bengal experienced four crucial shifts: 1)under the first
Islamic Sultanate which established itself in Bengal at a time when 2) the Mongols chose to
rewrite the political map of Asia and then again in the 16th century 3) first under the Husain
Shahis and then 4) under the Mughals. These shifts ocurred under the aegis of Islam.The
fourth and last shift occurred at a time when the Portuguese attempted to carve out an
independent place for themselves in the commerce of the Bay.
When the Bengal Sultanate established itself at Lakhnawati and started the process of
moulding Bengal into an Islamic conquest-state this multifaceted region experienced yet
another ontological shift. The establishment of Islamic rule in Bengal saw the region
incorporated into a complex political/religious/diplomatic/mercantile network that stretched
from China to southern Spain, Maghreb and Ifriquiya. The first Islamic rule in Bengal that
lasted from the 13th to the 16th centuries produced repercussions within: by the beginning of
the 14th century the many miens of Bengal, the different names/places/cultures that we
mentioned, had coalesced into the three principal areas of Gaur-Pandua-Firuzabad-
Lakhnawati (the older Varendra or the political heartland), Satgaon-Hugli-Tribeni (the old
Vanga or the cultural and economic pulse) and the Dacca-Suvarnagram region or the old
Samatata. A new name for the eastern  region had also emerged — Bangalah36.
Eastern and western Bengal were frequently at war. In the 14th century Ibn Batuta referred
to the fact that the ruler of Bangalah (or Samatata/Harikela in whose dominions lay
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Chattagram/Chittagong/Chatighan and which Ibn Batuta visited) was frequently at war
with the ruler of Lakhnawati. Ibn Batutah thus followed the accepted practice of distinguishing
between Bangalah and Lakhnawati. It seems, in contemporary perception, that the ancient
vanga or the west had become synonymous with Bangalah of  the east in the 14th century;
Lakhnawati further north was the focus of political might (and power tussles with the rest of
the gangetic plain) and was regarded as a country apart, in fact as the new-fashioned
state.37 That Bengal was still, in effect, two states under two sets of rulers for much of the
period under study here is therefore unquestionable.
Only the last frontier remained to be subdued, that of Harikela with its difficult terrain,
suspect loyalties and the magnificent port of Chattagram/Chatighan/Chittagong at its
southern tip; this was only partially achieved by the quasi-independent Mughal subahdar
Shaista Khan at the end of the 17th century. We know that between the 15th and 18th centuries
the Chattagram-Jugdia area was fought over by the kings of Arakan, Tiperah and Bengal38.
A new dimension was added to this conflict when the Mughal made Bengal a Mughal
province. Ananta Manik of Bhalwa frequently enlisted Arakanese help to retain his zamindari
in the face of the Mughal threat emanating from Bengal. This fight was complicated by the
Portuguese presence in the area . The latter frequently acted as mercenaries in the countries
of the Bay and were utilized as such by local rulers in their wars against each other.
This is not the place to detail the successful (and unsuccessful) attempts at expansion
beyond Bengal by the Bengal sultans. However under the Ilyas Shahis, throughout the 14th
century, attempts were made to extend hegemony over Kamrup, Kamta, Tirhut and Nepal to
the north and the powerful Ganga state (medieval north Orissa) to the south. Inscriptions
found in Kamrup indicate that a portion of Assam at least was brought under Muslim
control by the time Sikandar Ilyas Shah and Ghiyath-al-Din Ilyas Shah were on the throne of
Lakhnawati. Eaton opines that the activities of the militant Sufis who expanded rice cultication
in the east-aided by the riverine shifts of the 16th to the 18th centuries that rendered the
western delta ‘moribund’ and the southeast delta ‘active’-was an activity that extended the
eastern frontiers of Bengal39.
At the end of the 15th century Vipradas had described the mercantile dynamism of
Saptagram in the western delta. It was peopled by Hindus , Mughals and Pathans; it
contained a dazzling array of houses and conducted trade with Ceylon (Sarandib) and
Orissa. Since the Arakan trade was not mentioned it seems likely that Arakanese disturbances
in eastern Bengal had interrupted this trade. Possibly Chattagram/Xatigam conducted what
little trade continued to exist with Arakan40. Now, in the 16th century,  the  Husain Shahis
sought to enhance trade within their western domains by connecting Triveni (in the older
Vanga which had evolved into the cultural and economic heartland of Varendra) with Vanga’s
chief port Saptagram by way of a bridge in 1506. This bridge connected Saptagram and
Triveni with the main channel of the Bhagirathi because the Saraswati had dried up. This
endeavour reflects the westward  shift under Husain Shahi leadership that resulted in a
reorientation of trade routes to the west of Bengal.
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Under Husain Shahi aegis a new urban complex emerged in Bengal. Gaur was the capital,
Saptagram its port, Triveni its religious hinterland and Nabadwip its cultural centre. Vanga
thus saw a new phase of urbanization. Nabadwip attracted immigrants from Sylhet (a well
known intellectual centre of Harikela) and Chattagram and soon evolved into the scholars’
centre of Vanga. By 1560 Nabadwip  had grown into a well-known market town as well;
merchants were settling there and selling goods from locations as far off as Kashmir in the
north to Kanchipuram in the extreme south.
From this time on textiles (mainly cottons and some silk piece goods) began to be
manufactured in the towns along the lower Bhagirathi. These supplied the market towns
along the Bhagirathi and provisioned the trade conducted from Saptagram. Saptagram
ceased to function as a port with the establishment of Hugli as the chief port on the Bhagirathi
in 1580.  The impetus of urbanization in this region continued unabated and Hugli took over
the functions of Saptagram by connecting long distance trade to the hinterland. The
Portuguese came west and settled at Hugli.
Soon after Bengal came to be integrated more closely with northern India through yet
another endeavour — Sher Shah Sur’s efforts — to reorient the trade of Bengal from the
East to the West. This meant that Bengal had another outlet for its manufactures apart from
its riverine/oceanic trade. The construction of the Grand Trunk Road — which exists to this
day — ensured that Bengal would no longer remain a marginal sultanate. The Mughals
enhanced further the east-west shift. The Grand Trunk  Road which was built by Sher Shah
(1538-45) and finished by Akbar connected Bengal permanently with Delhi via Allahabad,
Benares and Awadh. After this time, Bengal’s commerce was firmly reoriented towards the
west.
In conclusion we can assert that just prior to the 18th century  the various Bengals
through history that we noted had combined into the two Bengals that still exist today : the
one situated around the heartland of Gaur, functioning through its port of Hugli; the other
situated around Dacca, functioning through Chattagram. While the Gaur-Pandua-
Lakhnawati-Murshidabad bloc housed Bengal’s better known western capitals the Dacca-
Vikrampur-Suvarnagram axis had functioned as a separate capital so much in history that
we can even assert that there still were two states in Bengal. (It is of course significant that
the borders of the present nation of Bangladesh corresponds to the old division of Samatata
and Harikela).
The Dacca-Vikrampur  area was the last frontier of Bengal; witness the Chandra and
Varman kings who ruled quasi-independently from the region as we have already seen. In
the wake of the ferment produced by the takeover of Lakhnawati the last Sena king ,
Lakshman, ran away to this area; later in the post-Mughal ferment of the ephemeral take-
over of Gaur dispossessed Afghan/Turk adventurers also fled there. In the 16th century the
Portuguese concentrated their commercial activities there. The Bengal Nawabs in the 18th
century transferred their less fortunate officers there. In time the Dacca-Vikrampur region
ceased to be a separate political unit and became instead an extension of Nawabi Bengal but
the region still retained its separate identity.
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Eastern Bengal was always the last frontier aka Eaton 41 but this frontier was repeated
endlessly throughout the early history of Bengal as well. Militant Sufis, radical rulers,
Portuguese adventurers and Arakanese raiders did not create this Turnerian frontier; this
frontier was a more gradual creation under the twin impulses of statecraft and religion from
the time of the spread of Buddhism in the early centuries of the first  milllenium and fashioned
further by Brahmins who brought to the area superior agrarian management skills. But it
was pushed forward relentlessly nevertheless throughout the centuries until Mughal
regulation of this frontier put a stop to this from the 17th century. Separate faiths, different
religious affiliations and the prevalence of many tongues and races still mark the east from
the rest in Bengal. By the 18th century, when our story ends, Assam (Kamrup) and Koch
(Cooch Bihar) delineated the final frontier of Bengal.
VII
Bengal’s history in the Islamic period is littered with references to Arabs, Pathans,
Afghans, Turks, Tajiks and Mughals. These groups — with their specific extra — South
Asian affiliations — introduced new ideologies and hegemons into Bengal. Their ethnic
designations emanated from four political blocs as we know them today : the Middle East
(which exported  a vast amount of Arabic speaking merchants to India’s shores), Afghanistan
which provided South Asia with the Ghaznavid and Ghurid kings (the Pathans came from
the same area), Turkestan or that vast area between China and Russia which comprised the
Mongol khanate and included Turks as both Tatars and Mongols (Mughals) and Tajiks
from the eastern reaches of Persia contiguous with Turkestan. In other words both the
Mughals and the Turko-Afghan sultans of India are Turks but the former are Mongol while
the latter are Tatars and traditional enemies of the Mongols. And the Tajiks are also Turks
but from a different area. In other words while all these ethnic groups were ‘Muslim’ by the
16th century their political affiliations, arising out of their area of origin, dictated the commercial
inclination (routes, commodities, ports) of each of these groups42.
Of these various groups it was the Afghans and Mughals who impacted most on Bengal
in the 16th century. Husain Shahi stability was destroyed with the Afghan victory in Bengal
in the 1530s. This shortlived Afghan triumph was shattered once again with the Mughal
victory (albeit nominal at that time) in 1576. The Mughal decree of 1580 to the Portuguese
Pedro Tavares to establish a port at Hugli signaled the passing away of the Husain Shahi
urban dream; from now on lower Bengal and not the Saptagram-Triveni-Nabadwip complex
would dictate Bengal’s mercantile history. Moreover the grant of decree also signalled the
coming into being of a new order in western Bengal: the beginning of Portuguese political
involvement in the western part of Bengal.
In the last analysis the only ‘Islamic’trading combine that showed staying power in the
Bay were the Persians. The Gromalles and the Khwajas of early Portuguese documents
exhibited remarkable staying power in the 16th century; in the 17th century we have
Muhammad Sayyid (the infamous Mir Jumla of Persian origin) as subahdar and monopolist
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in Bengal and the extensive Shi’a migration from Persia into Bengal during  Prince Shuja’s
subahdarship from 1639-60; and in the 18th century we get a group of wealthy Persian
merchants/officials dominating trade from Dacca.
The second Murshid Quli, Mirza Lutfullah of Tabriz, became governor of Orissa during
Nawab Shuja’s reign in Bengal. Subrahmanyam (1992) says that the second Murshud Quli
weathered the storm of the 1739-40 succession dispute and was appointed Naib-Nazim
(what the English refer to as the ‘Chota Nawab’) of Dacca during Alivardi’s reign 43; this
however is incorrect 44. He had been appointed Naib Nazim of Dacca by Shuja around 1727
and he remained in that position until 1734 when he was transferred to Orissa as Naib
Nazim45. The second Murshid Quli and his associates Mir Habibullah of Shiraz and Mir Razi
of Shustar appear to have practised a minor  variant of state mercantilism from Dacca and in
the process built up a clique of  Iranian and Central Asian traders in Bengal. This group also
maintained close links with Surat and Basra and there is every likelihood that a major
portion of Bengal’s westward trade was monopolized by this Iranian group.
What made Persians move to Bengal? They seem to have come initially mostly from the
Deccan where they migrated as merchants, religious leaders and men of letters from as early
as the 14th century 46, and in the 16th century, from Delhi as well. In the 16th century the major
Deccani sultanates — Bijapur, Golconda and Ahmadnagar — boasted Iranian antecedents
or links47.
The Persians soon metamorphosed into a court elite in the numerous Islamic courts of
South Asia and in so doing moved onto the east as well. They seem to have acted as traders
in Bengal; lured there by the rich pickings that trade offered.
What were the reasons behind this Persian exodus to South Asia in such huge numbers?
While this has been discussed in greater detail in my Merchants and Companies etc. we
may present a brief account here. The conventional reasons are the disturbances in the
Central Asian world which made Muslims view South Asia as the custodian of Islam, and
the diplomatic ties established by Akbar with the Safavid Empire. These were furthered by
Jahangir’s identification with Persian kingship and his alliance with Shah Abbas in the 17th
century. However a recent book48 suggests that more fundamental causes were at work
behind the migration of the Persians from Persia.
The Safavids converted to Islam in 1500. Persia therefore became a nodal point in the
vast Islamic network of trade and politics that spanned continents. The mercantilist and
statist policies of Shah Abbas I at the start of the 17th century were aimed to put Persia on
the world map of Islam. Shah Abbas’ policies resulted in the resettlement of the Armenians
in New Julfa as part of Shah Abbas’ strategy to counter the economic might of the Tajiks in
Persia (who now migrated to South Asia in large numbers), an exploitation of  the Armenian
overseas trade network and consequently increased trade with South Asia (since the
Armenians were long settled there) and the attempt to control all trade within Persia, especially
that of silk, to the profit of the Safavid state. The Persia of Shah Abbas was essentially a
mercantilist state and his silk policy was one whereby he attempted to counter the Ottoman
domination of the European market for silk.
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Persian-Mughal relations became more genial when Jahangir became emperor. In his bid
to assume the title of ruler of the world Jahangir entered into a friendly competition with
Shah Abbas49. During Jahangir’s reign a Persian embassy  toured all provinces of the
Mughal empire to see the fresh conquests. In keeping with the diplomatic/commercial  network
favoured by Shah Abbas this mission visited Bengal in the 1620s as well. This happened
during Islam Khan’s tenure and the mission was royally entertained at the Mughal provincial
court at Dacca50.
The Persians who settled in the numerous states around the Bay in Eastern South Asia
were soon made aware of the trading possibilities of the region. Trade with Arakan became
a  favourite; in time Persian migrants settled at the Arakanese court of M-rauk U persianised
the Arakanese court in terms of rituals and commerce. By the 17th century they were present
in Thailand as well — notably in Mergui and Auythia where they exercised considerable
power. It is claimed that even the Thai royal dishes were persianised51.
Religious dissidents from Persia also found their way to South Asia which, by  virtue of
its numerous and flourishing  Islamic states, was seen as the guardian of Islam. By the 17th
century many more such Persian elite were founding states in South Asia; the founder of
the Bengal nizamat of the 18th century, Murshid Quli Khan for example, had a Persian
background. Many more such nobles such as the second Murshid Quli followed and set up
secure mercantile bases in eastern Bengal.
There may  be yet another reason for this intensive commercial contact between Bengal
and Persia. It seems that as in Bengal Persian overland and maritime trade was more
complementary than competitive and the caravan trade between South Asia and Persia
enjoyed a long lineage. The overland route flourished throughout the 18th century and
carried as much merchandise as the sea route from Bengal.  Moreover not just cargo but
merchants kept in close touch with Persia. It was reported52 that in the middle of the 15th
century there arrived in Hormuz merchants from foreign territories  such as Egypt, Syria,
Anatolia, Turkestan, Russia, China, Java and Bengal , Siam, Tenasserim, Bijapur, Malabar,
Cambay, Arabia and Yemen — in short the entire trading world of medieval times was
present in Hormuz long before Portuguese arrival. Persia’s neighbouring state, Uzbeg Turan,
housed textile merchants from Bengal in December 155753.
Mohar Ali claims however that a section of Persians, known as Tajiks, had visited
eastern Samatata even earlier and takes an inscription of Ratnapala (9th/10th century) to
suggest that some may actually have settled in the region of  Chattagram/Arakan from
those times. Similar evidence comes from the Buddhist site of Paharpur (in Rajshahi district
just across the river from Murshidabad) where a coin from the Abbasid Caliph Harun-al-
Rashid has been found54.That Persia had a long lineage of contact with Bengal is now
corroborated by other scholars.
So Bengal was known to the Persians from very early times. Minhaj-I-Siraj who
accompanied Bakhtiar Khalji on his north-eastern campaign in Bengal was Persian. His
Tabaqat-I-Nasiri may have served as a practical guide for eastern India just as it does for
historians today. This long history of interaction between Bengal and Persia has attracted
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little attention in historical research55 and the ship-owning/mercantile activities of Persian
merchants and officials offer substantial scope for historical research on early medieval
Bengal.
VIII
We had noted that the period from the 13th to the 18th centuries had seen various hegemons
in operation in the Indian Ocean : the Mongol order of the 13th century, the early Islamic
network of the 14th century, the Asian states system of the 16th century and the Iberian
economic order.
As in most parts of Asia Islam in Bengal too had been tempered by its encounter with
the Mongols. It had weathered the Mongol rupture of the 13th century, because the Mongols
chose to bypass Bengal. What did the Mongol world order dream of? Certainly it dreamt of
political conquest, of making their civilization the centre of the world to rival Rome or
Constantinople. But it also dreamt of economic hegemony, of controlling a trans-Asian/
European trade that spanned continents, and of being a second Baghdad or Damascus.
Chingiz Khan did not only dream of plunder on a mega-scale, he also advocated trade as
ambassador between empires, and he established diplomatic relations (based on  tribute
and fiefdom) with states he conquered56. From the end of the 13th century Venetian, Pisan
and Genoese merchants acted as the Khan’s diplomatic messengers in an attempt to open
trade with the west through South Asia, Central Asia, southern Russia and Iran 57. Under
Kubla’I Khan China became a great trading nation . Similarly Taimur wrote to all kings and
princes not subject to him, urging them to send merchants since ‘trade makes for prosperity’58.
This Central Asian world order incorporating Rus, Iran, China, South East Asia, Tibet
and a part of  Central Asia59 came very close to Bengal’s eastern frontier (in the shape of the
T’ai Ahoms). The Mongols subverted the caravan routes on which the known world
depended : Baghdad was replaced by Tabriz in the 14th century as the emporia city in the
west-east trade. Tabriz was replaced in its turn by Samarkhand through Taimur’s conquests,
for he blocked the caravan routes running from the Black Sea to China and opened instead
a new route passing though his dominions: Transoxania.
The Mongol mercantile world now confronted the Mediterranean Islamic world order. In
1258 it sacked Baghdad and in 1260 the Mongols occupied Aleppo and Damascus: meeting-
ground of Christian-Islamic trade. Ibn Khaldun has left behing a description of the havoc
caused in the early Islamic network by the Mongols. It is precisely because of the uncertainity
caused in the old commercial cities of Asia that the nascent Bengal Sultanate could not form
a successful commercial policy in the 13th century. Things settled down in the 14th century.
It is only from the early Ilyas Shahi period (circa 1342) that we find once again the beginnings
of a commercial policy in Bengal.Ibn Batuta left the Maghreb and came to Bengal, traversing
the known commercial world of his time in this decade.
But the Mongol dream of economic domination was abortive. Despite the Khanate’s
desire to ally itself with the Papacy and combat Islam60 in the Holy Land this was not
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achieved. In both east and west robust Islamic empires carried on their political/diplomatic/
economic functions much as they had done before the Mongol interregnum. After wreaking
untold havoc in Asia and Europe the Central Asian order in South Asia soon became
integrated into the much older and commercially vibrant Islamic world order. Most Mongol
chiefs converted to Islam. By the 16th century the descendants of the Mongols, the Mughals,
were established at Delhi.
By the 16th century the older Islamic system — stretching from North Africa to China
that the Mongols had attacked — was no more. In its place were the mighty empires of the
Ottomans, the Safavids, the Mughals and the Turanis. Indeed it may not be an exaggeration
to say that four empires formed an integrated regional market with an emergent
‘international’credit system facilitating trade. Of these Shah Abbas’ Iran and Jahangir’s
India formed the most integrated bloc. Persian mercantilist policies after 1600 mixed with the
more powerful laissez-faire Mughal economy and its free trade economic policy. The
increasingly closer links with north, east, west and south-east  Mughal India that Iran
initiated were efforts at instituting an uniform credit/banking system to facilitate trade
between the two empires. By contrast trade with the Uzbeg states and Rus seems less
integrated from the point of view of India. Likewise with the Ottoman Empire; but here
strong religious ties, reinforced by the regular Haj sailings to Mecca from Akbar’s time
constituted a powerful argument for commerce. But we find no similar  financial and economic
policies  with the Ottomans as was the case with the Safavids; perhaps because here the
Armenians, and not local merchants, controlled the external trade.
Indeed Safavid Persia played a key role in determining Mughal relations with the external
world of Islam. It certainly played an important part in determining Mughal-Ottoman relations
for it controlled the land (caravan) routes between the two empires. We have already noted
the presence of South Asian merchants from as far away as Bengal present at both Hormuz
and Bukhara in the 16th century, selling cotton textiles at local markets61. The Ottoman bloc,
with which the Mughals had political and commercial ties, was nurtured through trade and
diplomatic missions that passed mainly through Iran. In short Iran guarded the key to the
trade with Ottoman Turkey and Rus while Uzbeg Turan controlled the routes to Rus.
In this states system of the 16th century China — which had played a major role in the
earlier Islamic world economy — hardly figured. This withdrawal impacted adversely on
Bengal; Bengal’s eastern trade suffered a setback. A new entrant into the Bay was the
European world economy in the shape of the Portuguese which now created a new maritime
space for Bengal in the north Bay.
IX
We have spoken of ‘world empires’ of  the Mings (1368), Ottomans (1453), the Mughals
(1526) and the Safavids (1500). We have spoken of the earlier Mongol and Islamic ‘world
orders’. What distinguishes a world order from a world system? What would be the role of
world economies? Where do world empires fit in?
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World empires can exist as sub-sets within a single world economy and the world
economy creates a world system with a hierarchical ordering of spatial units articulated to
the structure of the state that is central  to it 62. By contrast a world order is an ethical-legal
system which envisions ultimately the command of a world economy constituted by subject-
empires. The Indian Ocean was a world system motored by a world economy that was
constituted by the empires that participated in its economic life.
What denotes a world economy? It denotes, firstly, a spatial physical territory centred
around an initial process of state formation and its outward projections over space and
time. The two main markers of a world economy are its durability over time and its capacity
to govern economic activities from its peripheries to the advantage of its core area. Secondly,
a world economy, when it has retained its hegemony over surrounding regions for a long
enough time, transforms itself into a world system where the dominant positions of power
may not always be expressed through economic relationships. These can be political, cultural,
religious, and linguistic.
It is therefore evident that the Islamic world empire had managed to coalesce into an
Islamic world economy and ultimately an early Islamic world system. This came about when
the core of the Muslim world—bound on the east by the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, on
the north by the Caspian and Black Seas and on the west by the Mediterranean—placed
itself at the intersection of two great economic units : the Indian Ocean area and the
Mediterrannean area63. This aided its subsequent expansion east into India and China,
south into Ifriquiya and west into Iberia. This core area that had been one in Hellenistic
times but had split into two hostile units, the Roman/Byzantine and the Parthian/Sassanian,
was now united together once again through the Islamic conquests. This area experienced
capitalistic activity from very early times : the  signs of incipent capialism were intense
urbanisation, the rise of regional empires, the growth of international trade, emergence of a
labour market, the birth of a cash economy, the invention of a paper money and so on64.
Within this world functioned the world empires of the Turko-Afghans and the Mongols of
the 13th century; these in turn were absorbed into the greater world empires of the 16th
century—the Ottomans, the Safavids, the Mughals and the Mings.
The Mings withdrew from this world; with this withdrawal Bengal’s trade went into
decline. From 1506 the Husain Shahis worked at encouraging Bengal’s trade to the west and
not the east. In the 1560s the Venetian Cesare Frederici praised the great port of Saptagram,
emblematic of the 16th century shift from east to west within Bengal.
Finally, it was only the Portuguese who attempted to revive the Bay trade for another
century. Their objective was however not the older China-Bengal-Delhi-Red Sea network
but the Malacca-Pegu-Coromandel network which brought in very cheap gold and the best
rubies from Pegu. In this trade Arakan and Bengal occupied primate positions. Manrique’s
voyage to Bengal, and his negotiations with the Arakanese king in the 1630s are testimony
to a last attempt by the Portuguese to revive this once flourishing trade. But it was too late
by then. In 1612 Pegu was closed off to all trade. Also the massacre of the Portuguese by the
Arakanese at Dianga in 1607 soon after the latter had thrown out the Portuguese from
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Chattagram, then the execution of de Brito, the ‘independent’ Portuguese ruler of Syriam by
the Mons-Burmese in 1613,  followed by the defeat of the Portuguese by the Kandy forces
in Ceylon in August 1630, and finally the fall of Acheh in 1636 in the wake of Dutch conquests
in the Indonesian archipelago signified the collapse of the informal Portuguese network of
trade in the Bay  of Bengal. Bocarro laments the passing of the Bay trade in the Livro das
Plantas, in the 1630s 65 :
…the great Bay of Bengala, and Pegu, where …we once had great settlements of
Portuguese…all of them came to an end with great destruction and devastation,
and hence toaday one only navigates to the port of Orixa in the kingdom of Bengala
(Pipli), where there is a Portuguese captain appointed by the viceroy only in order
to treat with the Moorish vassals of the Mogor, to whom the port belongs…but
he has nothing else there, not even a house, save some made of straw….
The association between political power, long-distance trade and a high level of economic
activity in cities of substantial status was taken for granted in the Islamic and Iberian
worlds. The historical connection between long-distance trade and the process of
urbanisation was a simultaneous phenomenon; one that could make or break the port cities
of the Indian Ocean world. Wholesale merchants and bankers engaged in transcontinental
trade found all the supporting services at these ports. These advantages were held together
by primate port-cities in the Indian Ocean. There were, unfortunately, no such primate cities
in Bengal. Hugli and Dacca were riverine cities; hardly in a position to influence the greater
rhythms of trade in either the Bay of Bengal or the Indian Ocean.
The advantages enumerated here collapsed when there was political instability in the
states that supported this network. The urban centres were the first to pay a heavy price for
political instability or invasions. This is borne out in the case of Bengal’s ports. Their
instability, once the eastern Bay trade collapsed, has already been documented.
Earlier we had suggested the advantages of discussing regional histories in the world
systemic perspective. If we situate Bengal within the early and later Islamic world economies
then the enigma of its marginal position both in terms of the territorial history of South Asia
and the maritime world of the Indian Ocean can be transcended: in the 18th century, not just
Bengal but the whole region from Iran to South East Asia was undergoing internal decline.
Political vigour was flagging, once flourishing towns and their urban economies were lagging
behind. Indeed this whole area, and not just Bengal, was reeling from European attacks on
their economy, sovereignty and way of life. Seen in this context the 18th century debate,
while immediately crucial for Bengal and consequentially for South Asia as a whole, is
marginal to the rhythms of history that made up the greater history of the region66. Rice
culture was no longer divinely ordained, commerce was no longer celestially ordered. The
withdrawal of the Chinese, the collapse of Arakan and the demands of the second Islamic
world economy had put paid to both in Bengal. Between 1600 and 1800 Bengal became first,
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a commercial zone for the second wave of Europeans to explode into the Indian Ocean, and
then a British colony until 1947.
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